Different paths of change: home energy efficiency policy in Britain and Germany by Rosenow, Jan
	 ECEEE 2011 SUMMER STUDY • EnERgY EffiCiEnCY fiRST: ThE foUnDaTion of a low-CaRbon SoCiETY 261
Different paths of change: home energy 
efficiency policy in britain and germany
Jan Rosenow
University of oxford
Environmental Change institute
South Parks Road
oxford, oX1 3QY, UK
jan.rosenow@ouce.ox.ac.uk
Keywords
policy, homes, energy efficiency policy, Germany, UK
Abstract
This paper looks at long-term change with regard to domestic 
energy efficiency policy. More specifically, it discusses how the 
principal policy instruments targeting energy use in homes in 
the UK and Germany changed over time. The UK was the first 
country in the world that introduced obligations on suppliers 
to save energy at the customer end in 1994. Since then this 
policy changed rapidly and is now the principal instrument 
to deliver energy savings in the housing stock. Germany put 
in place large loans and grants schemes to finance residential 
energy efficiency measures. The CO2 Building Rehabilitation 
Program started in 2001 and was modified frequently over the 
last decade. This paper aims to answer three questions: First, 
how did the two policy instruments change over time? Sec-
ond, which long-term pressures caused such a remarkable shift 
and what were the key drivers of that change? Third, how does 
policy change in the UK compare to Germany?
Introduction
Understanding under which conditions policy change is likely 
to be feasible can help a great deal when it comes to future 
policy design. Too often policy proposals are doomed to fail 
because the constraints and drivers of policy change are not 
paid sufficient attention. This is particularly true for energy ef-
ficiency policy where proposals for new policies had been bold 
and ambitious, but were watered down in the policy process, 
not generating the promised results.
Some of the most frequently cited drivers for rapid policy 
change are crises such as energy price shocks (Campbell, 2004). 
The oil crisis in 1973 is a good example of policy change in-
duced by crises in the form of non-linear price signals. Whereas 
before energy efficiency was of very limited political concern, 
this changed almost overnight (Eyre, 1997). The oil crisis cre-
ated a conservationist approach to energy use where there was 
none before (Perez-Guerrero, 1975). However, while unex-
pected sudden crises type events certainly can explain some of 
the shifts in energy efficiency policy, many of the more recent 
changes to public policy were the result of more gradual and 
long-term pressures such as constantly high energy prices. Sim-
ilarly, the issue of climate change poses a challenge to energy 
efficiency policy that is more gradual in its character. Many of 
the policy shifts that happened in energy efficiency, particularly 
the recent changes, are to a large extent influenced by concerns 
about climate change. Some scholars even claim that in the UK 
climate change and energy policy converged and are no longer 
discrete policy areas (Lovell et al., 2009).
Considering the above, this paper looks at the process of 
policy change in the context of home energy efficiency policy 
in Germany and the UK, two countries that are internationally 
recognised for their ambitious home energy efficiency poli-
cies. Policy change can refer to various features of public policy 
such as the policy goals, the policy instruments, and the set-
ting of policy instruments (Hall, 1993). This paper focuses on 
two policy instruments and their development over time: the 
principal policy instruments for home energy efficiency in each 
country respectively that both display a high degree of policy 
change. The criterion applied to identify the principal policy 
instrument is its contribution to carbon emission reductions 
in the domestic sector compared to other policy instruments 
targeting the housing sector, i.e. the one with the largest effect 
on reducing carbon emissions is deemed the principal policy 
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instrument. Following this logic, in the UK this is the obliga-
tion on energy suppliers to save energy at the customer end. 
Germany’s key policy instrument is a loan and grant scheme 
run by the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the German 
Reconstruction Loan Corporation.
The structure of this paper is as follows: First, the paper in-
troduces two recent theories of policy change and gradual pres-
sures that helped inform the research. Second, a brief overview 
of the respective policy instruments, their basic architecture in 
the UK and Germany, and their change over time is presented. 
This includes an indicative evaluation in terms of the achieved 
energy and carbon savings. Third, the patterns of policy change 
in the two countries are compared drawing out differences and 
similarities referring to the theories outlined in the first sec-
tion. Finally, a concluding section discusses to what extent cur-
rent theories of policy change might help explaining the policy 
change experienced in Germany and the UK.
Theories	of	policy	change
When approaching policy change, one needs to be clear which 
elements of policy are actually looked at. Peter Hall (1993) 
made an attempt of decomposing the term ‘policy’ into its dif-
ferent elements, namely the goals of policy making, the instru-
ments deployed to attain those goals, and the setting of those 
instruments. This paper focuses on significant changes of the 
setting of two selected policy instruments over a defined period 
if time.
There are various theories about why policies change, each 
with different perspectives on the policy process. No single 
theory can explain policy change in all circumstances and some 
theories have more explanatory power concerning certain as-
pects of policy change than others. The three most prominent 
theories on policy change are the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work (ACF), the Multiple Streams approach (MS), and the 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory (PE) (John, 2003).
CrITIquIng	mAInsTreAm	TheorIes	of	polICy	ChAnge
There is a certain degree of overlap and some scholars argue 
that ACF, MS, and PE are in fact complementary (Cairney, 
2009, John, 2003, Meijerink, 2005, Zahariadis, 1998). All of 
the three theories of policy change rely on exogenous pressures 
as the key driver of major policy change: ACF hypothesises 
that ‘significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g. 
changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, sys-
tem-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other 
subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change 
in the policy core attributes of a governmental program’ (Saba-
tier and Weible, 2007, p. 220). MS refers to ‘focusing events’ 
such as crises as one of the key reasons for the opening of 
windows of opportunity which are a prerequisite for policy 
change (Kingdon, 2002). PE also relies heavily on external 
events as the key driver of policy change (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993, 1991).
The problem of such an approach is that it puts the focus 
on the key external events that create pressures for change but 
not on the complex search process that follows whereby actors 
actually determine what changes to make (Campbell, 2004). 
Also, there is evidence that despite a crisis and the expectation 
of major policy change sometimes only minor change takes 
place (Birkland, 1997, Nohrstedt, 2008, Walgrave and Varone, 
2008). Supporters of all the three theories of policy change 
recognise the need for a better account of the role of external 
pressures for policy change. Reviewing the ACF, Weible et al. 
(2009, p. 128) admit that ‘there is much to learn about the in-
tervening steps between an external perturbation and major 
policy change’. Similarly, John (2003, p. 489) asks PE scholars 
about the relationship between the nature of the policy input 
and the character of the policy output. There is no convincing 
account for the causal mechanism of the independent vari-
able (external pressure) and the dependent variable (policy 
change).
That is particularly true for the understanding of gradual 
pressures building up and reaching a tipping point. The focus-
ing event might just be the tip of the iceberg and act as a valve 
for accumulated pressure (Birkland, 1997). On a similar note 
Weir (1992) convincingly stresses that MS is ahistorical, be-
cause it does not sufficiently acknowledge the policy legacy of 
the past and how this impacts on policy making in the present. 
Responding to such criticism, Zahariadis (1999) acknowledges 
that more empirical research is required to better understand 
how processes such as incrementalism and path dependency 
affect MS. There seems to be a general tendency in political 
science to neglect cumulative causes and to focus on ‘causes 
and outcomes that are both temporally contiguous and rapidly 
unfolding’ (Pierson, 2003, p. 178).
A	new	lens	on	polICy	ChAnge
This paper looks through a relatively new lens at policy change 
by employing the concept of ‘friction’ that was recently de-
veloped by PE scholars as a response to some of the criticism 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009, Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Fric-
tion can be used to understand the build-up of gradual pres-
sures resulting in policy change rather than just the impact of 
major external events on the policy process. Similar ideas have 
been explored by historical neoinstitutionalist theorists such as 
Paul Pierson (2004).
friction
The idea of friction is a relatively recent addition to PE theory 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009, Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The 
concept of friction is based on the idea that policy makers (be-
cause of their bounded rationality and cognitive limits) can 
only deal with a limited number of questions at a time, and 
the multiple institutional venues constrain and slow down the 
policy response to policy inputs. Hence, there is a misbalance 
between policy inputs and policy outputs. As a result, some 
issues are not dealt with and pressure starts to build up in the 
system. Baumgartner et al. compare the mechanism to earth-
quakes:
Violent earthquake results from the friction and the associ-
ated buildup of pressure, not any momentary increase on the 
forces pushing to overcome the friction. At any given time, 
the response to the pressure is out of synch with the level of 
pressure applied: friction causes the linkage between inputs 
and outputs of the system to be disproportionate - underre-
sponse because of friction, then overresponse in response to 
built-up pressures. (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 607)
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Another metaphor for friction is a sandpile. The steady drop of 
sand grains on a flat plate does not lead to a constant flow of 
grains falling of the plate. In contrast, usually when one grain 
is added to the pile nothing happens and a sandpile builds up. 
But sometimes when one grain is added to the pile the system 
collapses in rapid landslides. This pattern is due to the friction 
of the sand and would not occur if material without friction 
was used (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).
The policy process follows a similar logic, Baumgartner et al. 
argue. Policy makers need to prioritise some policy inputs and 
neglect others. As a result, decision makers underrespond to is-
sues if they remain below a certain threshold, and only concen-
trate on those areas where concern is great requiring immedi-
ate attention. After an issue passes the threshold overresponse 
may take place as a result of past negligence and the built-up 
pressures. Therefore friction ‘is not an absolute barrier to ac-
tion, but rather a major hinderance. As it operates, pressure 
can mount, making change when it does occur, more profound’ 
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005, p. 88).
slow-moving	processes
Complementary to the recent developments in PE theory, 
Paul Pierson’s work on ‘tipping points’ and long term proc-
esses (2004) can contribute valuable insights. Pierson’s book 
‘Politics in Time’ is one of the most influential contributions to 
the strand of historical institutionalist theory (Bulmer, 2009). 
Pierson (2009, p. 40) convincingly illustrates how the social sci-
ences have mainly focussed on short term policy change with 
regard to both the causes and the outcomes of change:
In many contexts, however, a long, slow erosion of the sta-
tus quo may be a crucial factor in generating policy change. 
What may seem like a relatively rapid process of reform is 
in fact only the final stage of a process that has in fact been 
under way for an extended period.
Slow-moving processes may involve threshold effects that 
‘have a modest or negligible impact until reaching some criti-
cal level, which triggers major changes’ (Pierson, 2003, p. 182). 
The earthquake example referred to by Baumgartner et al. falls 
into this category, as do avalanches and the sand pile example. 
As the system reaches the threshold relatively minor fluctua-
tions become increasingly likely to trigger change. By focus-
ing just on those minor fluctuations, one misses an analysis 
of the preceding, long-term build-up of pressure. The exact 
level of the threshold is contingent; it depends very much on 
the particular context which is why claims about the nature 
and the importance of thresholds need to be made with care 
(Pierson, 2004).
relevance	for	home	energy	efficiency	policy
In more recent years home energy appears to be largely driven 
by gradual pressures such as climate change and high energy 
prices. Therefore, this paper tries to understand changes in 
home energy efficiency policy through a relatively new lens on 
policy dynamics and gradual pressures as outlined above. It 
does not yet, however, derive and evaluate a number of hypoth-
eses based on the theories, a task that will be accomplished at a 
later stage as part of the author’s doctoral research project. The 
preliminary interpretations offered in this paper are neverthe-
less informed by the theories outlined above.
Background
Below the basic logic of the two principal home energy effi-
ciency policy instruments is outlined for each country.
uK:	energy	effICIenCy	oBlIgATIons	on	energy	supplIers
In the UK, the Supplier Obligation (SO) is the most impor-
tant instrument to deliver energy and carbon savings in the 
domestic sector (OFGEM, 2005). Both the 2004 and 2007 En-
ergy Efficiency Action Plan highlight the SO as the principal 
policy mechanism to deliver energy savings in the domestic 
sector (DEFRA, 2007, 2004). As outlined in the Low Carbon 
Transition Plan, future GHG emission reductions in the do-
mestic sector are assumed to come mainly from an extension 
of the SO with an increasing target going forward (DECC, 
2009).
The basic concept of the SO is that Government imposes a 
savings target on energy companies that has to be achieved at 
the customer end. The target may relate to energy consumption 
or carbon emissions. In the UK, the target is set by the Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) for a defined pe-
riod of time. The energy regulator, OFGEM, is responsible for 
administering the SO and enforcing it. It defines individual sav-
ings targets for each energy company. The energy companies 
then contract installers of energy saving measures that carry 
out the work in homes according to a defined standard and 
with a certain benchmark for energy and / or carbon savings. 
Alternatively, energy companies may choose to work with the 
occupants directly. In the past, energy companies have for ex-
ample promoted the use of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) 
via mass mail-outs of free light bulbs, although this is now pro-
hibited. Businesses and industrial end-users are not covered by 
the scheme, they are covered by other policy instruments such 
as the Climate Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements 
as well as the recently introduced Carbon Reduction Commit-
ment.
While there was a succession of different SO schemes, the 
basic logic remained the same. The first SO scheme was called 
Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance (EESoP) and ran 
from 1994 to 1998. Its successors, EESoP 2 and EESoP 3, ran 
from 1998 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2002 respectively. In 2002, 
the scheme’s name was changed to Energy Efficiency Commit-
ment (EEC). EEC 1 was in place from 2002 to 2005 and EEC 2 
from 2005 to 2008. EEC was eventually renamed in 2008 to 
the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) that runs from 
2008 to 2012. For the post-CERT period a new scheme, called 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO), is planned. In some in-
stances the name change reflected changes of the SO such as a 
change of focus from energy to carbon emissions when CERT 
was introduced (see more details below), but generally it the 
changing names should not be overrated.
main	changes	of	the	so
Target
To sum it up, there were two substantial changes: First, the en-
ergy savings target was raised significantly since 1994. Second, 
the target definition changed.
The total energy saving target of the SO in 1994-1998 and 
2008–2012 cannot be directly compared, because the EESoP 1 
target was defined in term of energy to be saved, whereas CERT 
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defines the target in Mt CO2. According to OFGEM (2008c), 
the CERT target is equivalent to doubling the target under 
EEC 2, which was 130 TWh. Taking into account the 20 % 
uplift in September 2008 and the extension of the scheme to 
December 2012, the total (implicit) energy savings target of 
CERT is almost 500 TWh. That means that the original SO tar-
get increased eightyfold from 1994-1998 to 2008-2012. How-
ever, these figures are again not directly comparable, because 
the length of the different schemes differs. Therefore an aver-
age annual energy savings target is calculated that allows direct 
comparison of the schemes (see Figure 1).
The implicit annual energy savings targets increased almost 
seventyfold from 1994-1998 to 2008-2012. However, there are 
further caveats to comparing the targets on a like-for-like ba-
sis. The target definition changed over time. Under EESoP 1 
and 2, the target only related to electricity. EESoP 3 set a target 
for both electricity and gas separately. The EEC 1 and 2 targets 
were fuel standardised, allowing suppliers to achieve savings 
in homes heated by gas, electricity, coal, oil or LPG. Energy 
savings were carbon weighted and discounted in line with the 
HM Treasury Green Book, although the rate changed over 
time (guidelines for carrying out cost-benefit analysis). CERT 
then changed the target from energy to carbon emissions and 
abolished the discounting procedure (OFGEM, 2009b). All 
this makes it difficult to compare the targets on a like-for-like 
basis. However, the magnitude of target change is still remark-
able.
Cost of programme
As a result of increasing targets, the cost of the programme to 
energy suppliers went up from just £101.7 million in EESoP 1 
(£25 million per year) to £5.5 billion in CERT (£1.2 billion per 
year). While EESoP 1 and 2 obliged energy suppliers to spend a 
certain amount of money, later versions of the SO only provid-
ed indicative figures that were nonbinding. Suppliers passed on 
the costs of the SO to their customers. While the expenditure 
allowance was subject to supply price control (and the 1998 
supply price restraint) in earlier versions of the SO (EESoP 1 
and 2), prescribing the maximum that could be charged, ex-
penditure in later versions did not fall under such tight control 
and only indicative figures were provided. The average bill did 
increase by only £1 per household per year during the EESoP 
schemes, but by more than £50 per household per year under 
CERT, meaning a fiftyfold increase over 18 years.
Other
While the overall ambition and cost of the SO is probably the 
most remarkable change, there were other modifications that 
are notable:
• The first three SO schemes did not did not set a specific tar-
get for disadvantaged customers. However, EEC 1 was the 
first scheme that put in place a target for the so-called Pri-
ority Group, the defined group of disadvantaged customer. 
50 % of all savings had to be achieved within the Priority 
Group (OFGEM, 2001). This target did not change in EEC 2 
(OFGEM, 2004). However, under CERT the target was re-
duced to 40 % (OFGEM, 2009a).
• EESoP 1–3 did not allow trading of energy savings between 
suppliers. Trading of energy saving obligations was first al-
lowed in EEC 1. Suppliers were allowed to buy certificates 
from or sell those to other suppliers. However, trading did 
not play a major role, and only very few suppliers trades 
parts of their individual targets.
Since EESoP 3 suppliers are allowed to carry over energy sav-
ings from one SO period to another. In the beginning this was 
limited to 10 % of the target, but this limit was abolished with 
the inception of EEC 1.
germAny:	low	InTeresT	loAns	And	grAnTs	for	energy	
effICIenCy	meAsures
In Germany, low interest loan and grant schemes for energy 
efficiency measures are the most important policy instruments 
for saving energy in the domestic sector and particularly the 
existing housing stock. The schemes are administered by the 
KfW Banking Group, a Government-owned development 
bank. KfW schemes for building refurbishment provide low 
interest loans and grants to households for specified refur-
bishment measures including energy efficiency. Making use 
of both federal funding and national as well as international 
capital markets, the KfW issues loans with an interest rate lower 
than the market rates (currently 2.30–2.85 %, depending on the 
contract period). In addition, some of the funding provided is 
used to issue grants, although most of the funding is directed 
towards low interest loans, Homeowners, housing companies, 
and public bodies can apply for loans and grants at an interme-
diary bank which assesses the financial circumstances of the 
application. The intermediary bank forwards the application to 
the KfW which then approves the loan or grant.
	  
Figure 1: Annual energy savings target of SO in TWh. Based on various reports (DEFRA, 2008, OFFER, 1998, OFGEM, 2009b, OFGEM, 
2009a, OFGEM, 2008a, OFGEM, 2005, OFGEM and Energy Saving Trust, 2003)
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Several KfW programmes related to housing refurbish-
ment have been running since 1990 addressing energy ef-
ficiency to different degrees. For delivering energy efficiency 
in the existing housing stock the Integrated Energy and Cli-
mate Programme highlights the CO2 Buildings Rehabilita-
tion Programme (CBRP) as the principal policy instrument 
(BMU, 2007). Also Eichhammer et al. (2006) stress that Ger-
man home energy efficiency policy is dominated by the KfW 
scheme (there are other KfW schemes focussing on businesses 
as well). The CBRP started in 2001 and is still running. It has 
become the most important instrument in Germany to tackle 
carbon emissions from existing homes. While the Programme 
changed over time, the core idea of providing low interest loans 
(and later grants) remains the same. This paper focuses on the 
CBRP in the analysis of policy change.
main	policy	changes	of	the	CBrp
Funding and loans/grants issued
As already indicated above, the annual funding by the federal 
Government to support the CBRP changed significantly over 
time. The loans issued by the KfW more or less follow the feder-
al funding (Figure 2), and on average the value of loans issued is 
about three times the federal funding provided in a given year 
(BMU, 2009, BMVBS, 2010). Funding for the CBRP increased 
between 2001 and 2006 with a major step change in 2006 when 
funding almost quadrupled as part of the new government’s 
economic stimulus package. However, since then the picture 
is much more mixed and funding levels go up and down every 
year with future funding levels being very uncertain.
Grants were only issued from 2007 onwards and remain 
at a comparably low level when looking at the scale of loans 
provided by KfW. However, since the introduction of grants 
in 2007, the amount of grants increased more than sevenfold 
by 2009.
Other changes
The packages of measures eligible for funding from CBRP 
changed over time. In the beginning, only four packages of 
measures could receive funding from the CBRP. Further pack-
ages were added to the programme later on whereas others 
were taken out of the CBRP. In January 2007, in addition to the 
packages a new category of eligible measures was introduced: 
All refurbishments achieving the minimum energy efficiency 
performance of new buildings as prescribed in the Energy Sav-
ing Ordinance were offered a 5 % grant. For refurbishments 
resulting in energy consumption being 30 % lower than the 
minimum energy efficiency performance of new buildings 
defined in the Energy Saving Ordinance the grant offered was 
12.5 %. Furthermore, a special opportunity for pilot projects 
achieving 50 % or more energy efficiency of new build lev-
els was created (KfW, 2006b, Zentrum für Umweltbewusstes 
Bauen, 2007).
BrIef	evAluATIon	of	polICIes
This section provides a brief evaluation of the two policy in-
struments in terms of their effectiveness, i.e. the carbon emis-
sions and energy saved compared to the financial resources 
spent.
data	sources	–	uK
From the inception of the SO there were requirements to un-
dertake monitoring of the measures installed in order to check 
that the energy savings assumed were in line with the actual 
savings achieved. A sample of all households that received en-
ergy efficiency measures had to be monitored during all obliga-
tion periods of the scheme. For the purpose of this paper, the 
following sources have been used for the evaluation: EESoP 1-3 
(OFGEM and Energy Saving Trust, 2003); EEC 1 (OFGEM, 
2005); EEC 2 (OFGEM, 2006, OFGEM, 2008a); CERT (OF-
GEM, 2009a). The figures used for EEC 2 and CERT do not in-
clude the energy and carbon savings carried over from previous 
obligation periods; only those savings actually achieved under 
the respective scheme are considered. Savings under EEC 2 are 
only reported in TWh, and conversion factors from the De-
partment for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
have been used to convert energy savings in carbon savings 
taking into account the proportion of different fuels saved as 
reported by OFGEM. In order to get annual figures for saved 
carbon emissions the stated carbon savings of EESoP 1-3 and 
EEC 1-2 were prorated according to annual energy savings, for 
CERT saved carbon emissions have been reported on an an-
nual basis by OFGEMThe figures are not readily comparable 
for several reasons: First, the evaluation methodology applied 
changed over time (for example, energy savings were discount-
ed under early versions of the SO, but this is not any longer 
done). Second, the figures calculated for this paper are based 
on the assumptions outlined above and need to be revised for a 
	  
Figure 2: Federal funding of the CBRP & loans and grants issued. Based on BMVBS (2010) and BMU (2009)
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like-for-like comparison. However, the purpose of this section 
is to give a general estimate of the energy and carbon savings 
achieved and the figures calculated should suffice.
data	sources	–	germany	
The effects of the CBRP have been evaluated several times, 
including the induced energy and carbon savings. Figures for 
2001 are provided by Kleemann et al. (2003), who conducted 
the first detailed evaluation of the Programme. Kleemann 
et al. did not use actual data on energy use before and after 
the refurbishment measures were undertaken. Instead, they 
used the IKARUS space heating model to estimate the en-
ergy and carbon savings of the different measures for differ-
ent types of buildings. Those figures were then extrapolated 
to all of the buildings that received KfW funding. No such 
detailed evaluation exists for the years 2002-2004, but Doll et 
al. (2008) provide estimates for the carbon savings achieved 
in these years, quoting an unpublished presentation of the 
Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Develop-
ment (BMVBS) in 2006. IER and PROGNOS (2004) provide 
figures for the energy savings achieved in 2002 and 2003. For 
the period of 2005 to 2008), Clausnitzer et al. (2007, 2008, 
2009) carried out detailed evaluations of the programme, in-
cluding the energy and carbon emissions saved. Clausnitzer 
et al. (2007) surveyed a sample of the loan and grant recipi-
ents, sense-checked the results by using a software tool, and 
visited a sub-sample of properties. The survey results were 
extrapolated to all of the properties that received KfW fund-
ing. Clausnitzer et al. (2008, 2009) used a similar method in 
their evaluations.
Note that the studies cited above calculated the annual re-
duction of carbon emissions rather than the induced lifetime 
CO2 emissions reductions. However, the annual reductions 
can be converted into lifetime emissions saved by assuming an 
average lifetime of measures of 30 years, as shown by an addi-
tional analysis complementing the evaluation of Clausnitzer et 
al. (2007) by Gabriel and Balmert (2007).
Comparison	of	savings
A comparison of the data derived is subject to various limita-
tions because the energy and carbon savings accounting meth-
odology differs in the UK and Germany. Therefore the follow-
ing remarks have to be taken with a pinch of salt.
In the last 10 years both schemes generated savings of carbon 
emissions and energy consumption of a comparable magnitude 
(the CBRP did not exist before 2001 and the SO was at a very 
low level before EEC 1). In more recent years, the SO delivered 
higher savings than the CBRP (Figure 3).
From 2002 to 2008 about 2 billion Euros were spent by en-
ergy suppliers as a result of the SO (estimate based on indica-
tive figures provided by various OFGEM reports cited below 
Figure 3). According to the BMVBS (2010), in the same period 
federal funding for the CBRP amounted to more than twice as 
much (about 4.5 billion Euros). In case of the SO the energy 
customers paid for the scheme with their bills, while the CBRP 
funding was based on taxpayers’ money. Considering that both 
programmes led to comparable energy savings, the question re-
mains why the CBRP required significantly more funding. One 
reason could be the different energy efficiency performance of 
the building stock; dwellings in Germany are considered more 
energy efficient than in the UK. Hence energy savings are more 
costly as the low hanging fruits have already been picked. How-
ever, a more detailed analysis would be required in order to 
answer that question confidently.
Comparative	analysis	of	change	in	the	uK	and	
germany
Keeping in mind the recent theoretical advancements on 
gradual policy change and slow moving processes, the paper 
will now provide some (preliminary) explanations of why 
we can see the policy change that happened over time. The 
explanations are based on an analysis of government docu-
ments and, in case of the UK, various reports by the Envi-
ronmental Data Services (ENDS) Report. Note that this is 
not a comprehensive list of all the important factors; also, the 
explanations provided below are not distinct, but rather inter-
related. Further research needs to be carried out in order to 
investigate the validity of the claims made and the underly-
ing causal mechanisms. Because it would be a Herculean task 
to analyse the policy dynamics of the two instruments in all 
details, within this paper only a few notable examples will be 
looked at. When comparing the UK and Germany, there are 
similarities as well as differences concerning the drivers of the 
policy change described.
	  
Figure 3: CO2-emissions in mt lifetime emissions and TWh saved per year. Own calculations based on various sources (Clausnitzer et 
al., 2007, Clausnitzer et al., 2008, Clausnitzer et al., 2009, Doll et al., 2008, IER and PROGNOS, 2004, Kleemann et al., 2003, 
Kleemann and Hansen, 2005, Kuckshinrichs et al., 2010, OFGEM and Energy Saving Trust, 2003, OFGEM, 2005, OFGEM, 2006, 
OFGEM, 2008a, OFGEM, 2009a)
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sImIlArITIes
Climate	change
While climate change affects a whole range of different sec-
tors, it is particularly relevant for home energy efficiency policy, 
because homes in the UK and Germany are responsible for a 
large proportion of total carbon emissions. In both countries 
climate change was a major driver of policy change of the prin-
cipal home energy efficiency policy. At its inception, the Ger-
man CBRP was part of the newly established National Climate 
Protection Program, and the purpose of the scheme was also 
mirrored in its name: CO2 Building Rehabilitation Program 
(BMU, 2000). Extensions of the CPRB in 2003 and 2005 were 
justified with regard to its importance for climate policy. The 
CBRP also featured in the 2005 National Climate Protection 
Programme (BMU, 2005), as well as the 2007 Integrated En-
ergy and Climate Programme (BMWi and BMU, 2007). Most 
recently, the CBRP was highlighted in the 2010 Energy Concept 
as one of the key policies to reduce carbon emissions in the 
domestic sector.
Similarly, the first British SO, EESoP1, was introduced as a 
result of national climate policy: together with the E-factor (the 
energy efficiency price premium for gas, see below), EESoP 1 
was supposed to raise money for the Energy Saving Trust (EST) 
that was established by Government, British Gas and public 
electricity supply companies in 1992 to reduce home energy 
use and the associated carbon emissions. The EST played a key 
role in the Government’s climate policy strategy for the domes-
tic sector as outlined in the 1994 UK Climate Change Program 
(HM Government, 1994). Climate change continued to play 
a major role for the SO. Another example is the 2006 Climate 
Change Bill that introduced the Carbon Emissions Reduction 
Target (CERT). While earlier SO scheme names always referred 
to energy efficiency, CERT explicitly focused on carbon emis-
sions. CERT became the most important climate policy in the 
domestic sector and is also supposed to deliver the majority of 
domestic carbon savings in the future (DECC, 2009). However, 
earlier versions of the SO were also driven by discussions about 
climate change following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.
rising	energy	prices
Rising as well as generally high energy prices also played an 
important role for the development of the SO and CBRP. In the 
UK, this was probably most notable in 2008, when residential 
energy prices went through the roof, while energy suppliers 
reported large profits:
Residential gas prices in 2008 increased almost by 50 % 
in real terms in just four quarters. This was a result of rising 
wholesale gas prices in continental Europe, where gas pric-
es are contractually linked to oil prices. Similarly, electric-
ity prices went up by almost 30 %, also mainly due to rising 
wholesale gas prices. In the context of increasing energy bills, 
there were calls in early 2008 for a windfall tax on energy sup-
pliers. A heated discussion started after OFGEM reported to 
the Treasury and the Committee on Business and Enterprise 
that energy companies made £9 billion profit from EU ETS 
permits which were issued for free. In January 2008, OFGEM 
proposed a windfall tax on the major energy suppliers to 
help the fuel poor (OFGEM, 2008b). Just a few weeks after 
the OFGEM proposal, Government held a meeting with the 
heads of major energy suppliers and told them that they might 
face a levy on their profits to help the poor. As expected, the 
proposals were not met with great enthusiasm by the energy 
suppliers. There were expectations that the 2008 Budget might 
introduce a windfall tax, but this was not the case.Discussions 
about a windfall tax continued and in July 2008 the House of 
Commons Committee on Business and Enterprise argued that 
‘there is a compelling rationale for at least a modest, one-off 
top-slicing of these gains to help fund action to reduce the en-
ergy bills of vulnerable families in the long term’ (House of 
Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, 2008, p. 47). 
Increasing profits made by energy suppliers such as Centrica 
after raising domestic fuel prices by 35 % led to a renewal of 
calls for a windfall tax in August 2008. There was, however, no 
agreement in Government on the matter – Chancellor Alistair 
Darling and John Hutton, the Business Secretary, opposed a 
windfall tax on the basis that energy companies needed extra 
funds to expand low carbon energy sources. More than 70 La-
bour MPs signed a petition that called for a windfall tax and 
hoped to make the issue one of the dominating themes of the 
party’s annual conference in September, among them Geof-
frey Robinson, a key alley to Gordon Brown, who devised the 
windfall tax on energy companies in 1997. In early August 
2008, Government examined different alternatives to a wind-
fall tax. One of them was to oblige energy companies to spend 
the bulk of the money under CERT in the first two years, and 
also to increase the share spent on helping the fuel poor. Rais-
ing the proportion of auctioned EU ETS permits and a carbon 
levy was also considered. Government eventually designed a 
£1bn package of new funding and measures to tackle fuel pov-
erty and threatened the energy companies with a windfall tax 
in case they did not sign up for the package.
On 11 September 2008, Government finally revealed the 
package they negotiated with the energy companies – the 
Home Energy Saving Programme. The package included an 
increase in the existing CERT target by 20 % with a new tar-
get of 185 million lifetime tonnes of CO2 for the period April 
2008 - March 2011. That implied additional expenditure by the 
energy suppliers of an estimated £560 million (HM Govern-
ment, 2008). Government argued that the programme had ad-
vantages over a windfall tax and that ‘by choosing this route the 
Government can more swiftly help families cut fuel bills now 
and in the medium term; help secure the long-term investment 
in new low-carbon energy infrastructure this country requires; 
and help keep prices down’ (HM Government, 2008, p. 2).
In Germany energy prices impacted on the CBRP too. Pro-
tecting consumers from high energy prices and future price 
hikes was used frequently as an argument by politicians to 
justify the expenditures on the CBRP. Furthermore, demand 
for KfW loans and grants was high as a result of rising energy 
prices. This way, rising energy prices put indirect pressure on 
increasing the funding for the CPRB.
Hence energy prices impacted on policy change in two ways: 
First, non-linear price signals such as those in 2008 put pres-
sure on Governments to act. Second, constantly high energy 
prices acted as a more gradual pressure similar to the climate 
change issue. Interestingly, raising the SO target by 20 % led 
to an increase of energy prices as suppliers are allowed to sim-
ply pass through the costs of the SO to the energy customers. 
Therefore the move had no significant financial impact (if at all) 
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on energy suppliers’ profits (which was the focal point of the 
debate). Government presented the decision as if energy sup-
pliers had to spend an additional £1 billion on energy efficiency 
without mentioning that consumers were to pay for this in the 
end. It seems that energy companies’ pleas for not putting a 
windfall tax on them because they desperately needed to invest 
in new infrastructure convinced the government.
Pierson’s concept of tipping points seems to reflect some of 
the developments described above. With energy prices already 
being at a fairly high level after slowly rising since 2000, a fur-
ther increase in early 2008 reached a threshold pushing high 
energy prices high up on the political agenda.
dIfferenCes
venue	change
One of the levers of policy change discussed in the literature 
on the theory of policy change is the so-called venue change. 
Venue change refers to situations when the institutional loca-
tion of decision authority changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993). Such a venue change occurred in the UK in 2000:
In 1994, the electricity regulator, OFFER, put energy effi-
ciency standards of performance (EESoP) on the Public Elec-
tricity Suppliers (PESs), the fourteen companies created when 
the electricity market in the United Kingdom was privatised in 
1990. Over a 4-year period EESoP 1 raised about £100 million 
for energy efficiency projects, equivalent to £1 per customer per 
year (Owen, 1997). However, OFFER did not raise the amount 
of money expected by ministers, and OFFER’s Director General 
had concerns that higher obligations ‘would raise issues more 
appropriately dealt with through general fiscal policy’ (ENDS, 
1994a). Also the second EESoP scheme, which operated from 
1998-2000, did not raise significantly more funds than EESoP 1. 
Using similar arguments, OFGAS rejected such a scheme for 
the gas sector entirely (see more details in section on change 
of key personnel). Without changes in primary legislation it 
looked like further measures would be extremely difficult to 
implement. The new Labour Government that came into power 
in 1997 announced a review of utility regulations. In 2000, the 
proposals took shape and were passed through parliament as 
part of the Utility Bill. The Bill gave the Secretary of State pow-
ers, by order, to impose energy savings targets on gas and elec-
tricity utilities. This resolved some of the conflicts over the first 
SO schemes, which struggled to get regulators’ support due to 
conflicting duties and unclear responsibilities. The Utilities Bill 
directed the responsibility for target setting to Government and 
obliged the regulator to implement the schemes that would be 
needed to reach the targets. This enabled Government to sig-
nificantly extend EESoP, imposing much more ambitious tar-
gets on energy companies (ENDS, 2001). Government set the 
first target in the Electricity and Gas (Energy Efficiency Obliga-
tions) Order 2001. The target of the old EESoP 3 scheme was 
only 11 TWh (4.9 TWh Electricity & 6.1 TWh Gas), whereas 
its successor, EEC 1, put a much higher target of 62 TWh on 
energy suppliers (OFGEM, 2005).
In Germany, no such venue change occurred. The CBRP was 
always run by the KfW and funded by the BMVBS and its pred-
ecessors.
The venue change that occurred in Britain resulted from a 
lengthy political debate about the role of the energy regulators 
and their unwillingness to increase expenditure for energy ef-
ficiency measures. In order to realise substantial carbon emis-
sion reductions in the domestic sector modifying the institu-
tional framework appeared to be the only option. Hence the 
venue change was a deliberate means to achieve carbon reduc-
tion goals in the housing sector rather than an unrelated coin-
cidence. With regard to the theories on policy change and grad-
ual pressures the following observations can be made: Due to 
the inability of the institutions in place (in this case OFGAS and 
OFFER) to raise the energy saving target, the pressure to gen-
erate the carbon emission reductions elsewhere increased. Di-
recting the target setting powers to central government rather 
than the regulator was seen as the only way of dealing with the 
pressure to achieve carbon emission reductions in the housing 
stock. The concept of friction developed by Baumgartner and 
Jones assumes limited processing capabilities of institutions 
resulting from the inability to deal with all issues at all times. 
However, in this case the institutional structure itself did not 
allow the translation of policy inputs (pressure to cut carbon 
emissions) into policy outputs (effective SO).
Budget	constraints
Budget constraints can act as a powerful force on policy in-
struments and their calibration. In other words, pressure to cut 
public spending can transcend the boundaries of public finance 
considerations and affect the home energy efficiency subsys-
tem, an effect known as ‘subsystem spillover’ (Howlett, 2002). 
If the policy instrument in question is heavily depended on 
government funding, austerity measures may as well include 
reducing expenditures for the instrument. In cases where the 
policy instrument is more or less independent of budget alloca-
tion austerity measures are much less likely to impact on its set-
tings. The CBRP and the SO represent such cases: in Germany 
the CBRP was subject to austerity measures whereas the SO 
in the UK remained untouched, although details of the post-
CERT scheme, the Energy Company Obligation, are still to be 
seen with detailed proposals due later this year.
In Germany, the CBRP was threatened by cuts announced in 
the draft budget for 2010 in December 2009. As a result of the 
increased spending in 2009, only 1.1 billion Euros were left in 
the budget for the scheme, compared to almost 2.2 billion Euro 
that had been spent on the CBRP in 2009. The financial contri-
butions to the KfW programmes were put on hold in January 
2010 and KfW stopped approving applications for loans and 
grants. The reason was that the budget for the year 2010 was not 
yet in place and that demand for loans and grants was higher in 
2009 than expected. However, shortly after the CBRP was put 
on hold, and following objections voiced by various industry 
associations and NGOs, the Bundestag approved preliminary 
spending with regard to the KfW programmes. The construc-
tion industry association Bundesvereinigung Bauwirtschaft 
asked the Government to top up funding for 2011 in order to 
make sure that the 1.5 billion Euros per annum announced in 
the investment package in 2008 would be provided. However, 
in June 2010, a leaked letter to the coalition MPs from the Min-
ister of the BMVBS, Peter Ramsauer, unveiled that further cuts 
of around 50 % of the CBRP were planned for 2011 in addition 
to the cuts already made earlier, leaving the scheme with only 
450 million Euro. This was later confirmed in a meeting of the 
MP Committee on Transport, Construction, and Urban Devel-
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opment. Reasons given for the cuts were mainly that the ‘debt 
brake’, a measure to freeze public debt that was introduced into 
the Constitution, would not allow for the programmes to con-
tinue at current levels. Also, it was argued by the Conservative-
Liberal Coalition Government that low interest rates would 
enable investors to find loans elsewhere. As a result of the cuts 
KfW announced in August 2010 that single measures would 
receive no further funding from 01 September 2010. Also, the 
funding stream for special measures only continued to support 
advice on refurbishment by energy efficiency experts, but not 
replacement of storage heaters and optimisation of heating sys-
tems.
In Britain the SO is paid for by the energy companies but 
energy suppliers are permitted to pass the costs through to 
households as part of their energy bill. Therefore the treasury 
has no involvement in the financial transactions taking place 
and does neither benefit from nor contribute to the SO. Hence 
even substantial spending cuts as seen at the moment cannot 
affect the SO.
support	for	struggling	construction	industry
Another case of subsystem spillover effects can be observed 
with regard to the construction industry. The CBRP in Ger-
many was heavily influenced by developments in the struggling 
construction industry whereas this issue played no significant 
role in the UK. An explanation can be found when looking at 
the development of the construction industry in the two coun-
tries: 
Between 2000 and 2008 the number of jobs in the German 
construction industry dropped by 35 % with turnover declin-
ing by 14 % in the same period (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). 
The late 1990s were characterised by a similar trend. Already at 
its inception, the CBRP was justified with securing construc-
tion industry jobs alongside delivering climate protection. Ref-
erences to the construction industry can be found throughout 
the CBRP’s development: In a policy statement in March 2005, 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised to extend the CBRP to 
the end of 2007, keeping it at the same level as it was in 2005 
(Bundesregierung, 2005b). He referred to the need to support 
jobs in the construction industry particularly in small and me-
dium enterprises. This was confirmed in the twenty point pro-
gramme for economic growth, in which Government promised 
to provide 720 million Euro for the scheme’s extension, again 
with a reference to the construction industry alongside with cli-
mate change (Bundesregierung, 2005a). Early in 2006, Govern-
ment modified the CBRP once again, and an uplift of the finan-
cial resources provided was announced after a Cabinet meeting 
in Genshagen on a programme for economic growth and em-
ployment. For the period 2006-2009, Government promised to 
allocate 4 billion Euro, a significant increase of the programme’s 
ambition (Bundesregierung, 2006). This was part of the initia-
tive ‘Housing, Environment, Growth’, which featured in the 
investment programme announced after the Cabinet meeting. 
One of the key reasons for the uplift provided by Construction 
Minister, Wolfgang Tiefensee, was job creation and keeping 
jobs in the construction industry (KfW, 2006a). Similar refer-
ences can be found in later policy documents.
Contrary to Germany, very few, if any, references to the con-
struction industry can be found in policy documents on the 
SO. An explanation could be the different trends in the con-
struction industry: while the sector struggled for more than a 
decade in Germany, from 2000 to 2008 jobs in the British con-
struction industry saw a 34 % increase with economic output of 
the sector almost doubling (Office for National Statistics, 2010). 
This is not to say that there is a definitive causal link here but it 
seems likely that there is.
Change	of	key	personnel	in	institutions
Change of key personnel can trigger policy change in some 
instances and is a recognised mechanism in the literature on 
policy change (e.g. Sabatier, 1988). A good example of the im-
pact of changing key personnel affecting the dynamics of policy 
change can be found in the UK during EESoP 1 and 2:
In 1991, Sir James McKinnon, the Director General of OF-
GAS, announced a new gas price control formula to operate 
from 1992. This formula would include an ‘E-factor’ allowing 
gas suppliers to pass 100 % of the costs of energy efficiency 
projects approved by the Director General through to gas cus-
tomers. McKinnon expected that around £50 million a year 
might be spent on energy efficiency measures (Owen, 2006). 
Money raised via the E-factor was supposed to help fund the 
Energy Saving Trust (EST) that was established by Government, 
British Gas and public electricity supply companies in 1992 to 
reduce home energy use and the associated carbon emissions 
(Owen, 1997). However, in 1994 Claire Spottiswoode, the new 
director of the gas supply regulator OFGAS, rejected raising 
money for energy efficiency measures administered by EST via 
higher gas prices (ENDS, 1994b). Such decisions, she argued, 
were within the realm of elected politicians and could not be 
decided by the regulator (ENDS, 1994a). As a result, British 
Gas submitted a greatly scaled down package of EST projects to 
OFGAS, but most of their proposals were subsequently rejected 
by the regulator (ENDS, 1995). In the end less than £2 mil-
lion compared to the £50 million announced by McKinnon 
was spent by the time the E-factor had ended in March 1997 
(Owen, 2006). Claire Spottiswoode resigned in 1998 and was 
succeeded by Callum McCarthy who was much more sympa-
thetic to energy efficiency programmes than his predecessor. 
In 1999, EST urged Government to extend EESoP 2 as it was 
coming to an end in 2000. EST hoped that gas suppliers would 
also be covered (ENDS, 1999a). The House of Commons Envi-
ronmental Audit Committee took EST’s concerns forward and 
recommended the extension of EESoP, including a separate 
scheme for gas suppliers (House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Select Committee, 1999). Within four days after publica-
tion of the Committee’s report, newly created OFGEM (provi-
sional merger of OFFER and OFGAS, later formally enacted in 
the Utility Bill) issued proposals to extend the electricity EESoP 
scheme for two years from April 2000 and also proposed a new 
EESoP scheme for gas suppliers for the same period with a sav-
ings target even higher than the electricity SO (ENDS, 1999b, 
OFGEM, 2000). This was a significant shift considering OF-
GAS’ past opposition to an EESoP type scheme for gas and can 
be explained to a large extent with the appointment of a new 
Director General in 1998.
With regard to the theoretical lens adopted in this paper the 
following observation can be made: due to the resistance of its 
director, the institution in question (in this case OFGAS) could 
not respond to and process policy inputs such as pressure to 
deliver energy savings at the customer end. This was not a case 
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of limited abilities of processing information, which is the sort 
of causal mechanism the friction concept by Baumgartner and 
Jones refers to, but rather a deliberate decision by the head of the 
organisation not to respond to the pressure put on the institu-
tion. However, the pressure to act built up in the meantime, and 
Government needed to find a way of delivering energy and car-
bon savings in the housing sector if the reduction targets were 
going to be met. Once a new director took office, who was more 
open and cooperative to respond to the demands, policy change 
took place. It seems that a single person can play a significant 
role in resisting external pressure for an organisation as a whole. 
If external pressure builds up over time, it can be released fairly 
quickly if a more responsive person replaces the former.
fuel	poverty
While there is fuel poverty both in the UK and in Germany, 
the issue was always much higher up on the agenda in Britain, 
where fuel poverty is an important driver of energy efficiency 
policy, and became a distinct issue of public concern following 
the oil crisis in 1973-1974. Fuel poverty in the UK is defined as 
the need to spend more than 10 % of household income on all 
energy use in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime 
and other energy services (Boardman, 1991). The importance 
of fuel poverty for the energy efficiency debate is manifested 
in the launch of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy in 2001. The SO 
was always supposed to help those living in fuel poverty, but 
only the implementation of EEC 1 required suppliers to spend 
a fixed proportion of money on energy efficiency measures 
in homes of disadvantaged customers in the so-called Prior-
ity Group. Although CERT reduced the Priority Group target 
from 50 % to 40 %, the recent extension of CERT to 2012 also 
included provisions for a Super Priority Group, i.e. the most 
disadvantaged customers within the Priority Group.
Unlike the UK, there is no systematic fuel poverty policy 
in Germany. The debate has not gone beyond various pilot 
projects and statements by different stakeholders. Hence there 
are very few references to fuel poverty in the development of 
the CBRP. It is also notable that the CBRP is essentially a loan 
scheme offering loans to those who can proof their financial 
credibility. The fuel poor are unlikely to receive such loans.
There is no convincing explanation for the different level of 
attention fuel poverty receives in the two countries. One could 
argue that fuel poverty is simply not a problem in Germany, 
which is why it does not constitute a major policy issue. How-
ever, there is evidence that this is not the case, and that a sub-
stantial number of households is affected by it. Unfortunately, 
there are no reliable estimates that could be used for a mean-
ingful comparison of levels of fuel poverty (Kopatz et al., 2010). 
More research is required to investigate why this issue became a 
major policy area in the UK but not in Germany.
Conclusion
This paper sketched the development of the principal home 
energy efficiency policy instruments in the UK and Germany 
from their inception identifying some, but not all, driving forc-
es that impacted on policy change. Both the SO and the CBRP 
show remarkable and frequent changes in their development, 
and arguably few people would have expected the two schemes 
ever reaching the scale they reached in recent years.
Comparing the two cases similarities have been identified 
such as the impact of the climate change issue on home energy 
efficiency as well as rising energy prices. There are, however, 
also idiosyncratic drivers such as fuel poverty in the UK and 
the struggling construction industry in Germany. In the UK, an 
interesting venue change took place when central Government 
took the target setting responsibility for the SO with a major 
impact on the SO’s development. Furthermore, change of key 
personnel plaid a role in the early days of the SO as did budget 
constraints more recently in Germany.
Coming back to the introduction of this paper, it seems that 
home energy efficiency policy, or at least the most important 
instruments in Germany and the UK, is driven not only by 
crisis-like events (although those played some role such as the 
2008 price hikes and the resulting CERT uplift), but by more 
subtle gradual and long-term pressures. One of the areas future 
research should focus on are the casual mechanisms by which 
such long-term pressures impact on policy change i.e. not just 
establish that they are important but how they actually affect 
outcomes of the decision making process. Are there certain trig-
ger points, thresholds, and spill over effects or does the policy 
system deal with those pressures proportionally? What role do 
stakeholders play in the process and how do the different ac-
tors influence policy change? Why do some issues have a major 
impact on policy change in one case but not in another? Further 
research is required to answer these questions appropriately. 
Home energy efficiency policy promises to be an interesting 
and rewarding case for doing more research on policy change.
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